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By means of the old, we come to know the new.    -----  Confucius 
 
First of all, one point seems in order regarding the title: this article is not intended to be 
comprehensive in its coverage. Rather, it focuses on a deliberately and highly selected body of 
studies on the division of labor ranging from ancient Greeks to WWII as represented by those 
reproduced in Sun (2005a), with particular attention paid to what I believe has been relatively 
unknown  even among economists of specialization. A more systematic examination, covering 
hundreds of studies on the division of labor by ancient Greeks, ancient Chinese, medieval Islamic 
scholars, medieval Latin scholasticists and Anglo-Europeans of recent centuries is found in Sun 
(2005b).                  
 
But what is the (commonly accepted definition of) division of labor? The one that Peter 
Groenewegen uses for the entry “division of labor” in New Palgrave’s Dictionary of Economics 
(1987, p.901) may be accepted by overwhelmingly most, if not all, economists: “The division of 
labor may be defined as the division of a process or employment into parts, each of which is 
carried out by a separate person.” That is, individuals cooperate, consciously or not, to undertake a 
divisible process or employment. As such, there naturally emerge two fundamental questions: 
Why, and how does the separation of employment among persons bear upon important economic 
                                                  
∗ The author thanks James Buchanan, Yew-Kwang Ng and Russell Smyth for helpful comments on a draft of 
the introductory chapter of the book Sun (2005a), from which this article is revised and enlarged. The usual 
caveat applies.   
  1and social consequences? In fact, the studies to be surveyed below that emerged over twenty-five 
centuries or so up to WWII basically centre round the above questions.     
 
We will first of all map out the evolution of ideas about division of labor up to the classical political 
economy in Sections I and II. For the body of economic analysis was considerably enriched since 
then, with different schools/perspectives simultaneously developing and sometimes competing with 
one another, we will focus on three themes, explored respectively by three most influential schools 
that have made contributions of lasting value to the economics of the division of labor. Section III 
examines the idea of mutual interdependence between increasing returns to the division of labor 
and the extent of the market originating from Smith, substantiated by Wakefield, Mill, Marshall and 
culminating in Young (1928). Section IV focuses on the division of labor in society and the division 
of labor in manufacture, on which Marx offers important insights, foreshadowing some modern 
theories of the firm well into 1990s. Analyses of unfavorable sociological consequences of the 
division of labor are also briefly surveyed in this section. Section V examines literature on the 
overarching theme of the spontaneous order, which can be traced back to Mandeville and was 
later on elaborated by the Scottish Enlightenment men, and the Austrians especially Hayek. 
Indeed, the Austrians not only developed a general theory of the spontaneous order but also 
applied it to analyses of many issues that are concomitant with the division of labor, in particularly 
the origin of money and the socio-economics of dispersed knowledge. Finally, Section VI 
concludes.  
 
I.   GREEK ORIGINS, MEDIEVAL ISLAMIC WISDOM AND SCHUMPETER’S “GREAT 
GAP” THESIS 
 
The idea of increasing returns to specialization is old. At the latest, ancient Greek philosophers, 
dated from Democritus (460BC - 370BC), had already brought it to the fore in their socio-economic 
discourses.
1 In the writings of Xenophon and Plato in particular, two most important insights of the 
division of labor that Adam Smith (1776) famously articulated about two millennium later, namely 
increasing returns to labor specialization and the division of labor being limited by the extent of the 
market, figured prominently. Xenophon (431 - 354 BC) clearly perceived the association of the size 
of the city in terms of inhabitants with the division of labor in illustrating why a larger city, compared 
to a smaller one, allows for greater division of occupations and thus renders products of both a 
finer quality and a larger quantity (Xenophon 1886, pp. 244-5). In particular, gains from the division 
of labor are exemplified by cooking for the king in Xenophon (ibid). Furthermore, Xenophon (1994) 
discussed in somewhat details the sexual division of labor within a family, a topic that was to be 
picked up by  
 
  2Thomas Hodgskin (1827) and Marxists in the 19
th century and nicely integrated into a neoclassical 
theory of human capital in the 20
th century (e.g., Becker 1985).  
 
Similar to Xenophon, Plato also based his theory of the emergence and development of the city on 
the notion of increasing returns to the division of labor. Indeed, in his celebrated The Republic 
(360BC), Plato developed, quite consciously, a theory of how a city emerges and then grows by 
exploiting the gains from the division of labor and saving on trading costs (Plato 1997, pp. 1008-
13).
2 Perhaps more remarkably, in Plato’s model growth of a city leads to emergence of 
professional merchants, a legal system and army among other new occupations, thus anticipating 
what Rosenberg (1976) refers to as “another advantage of the division of labor” in Smith’s 
economic system. As a matter of fact, Plato’s conception of social division of labor in some 
important aspects bears resemblance to what were to be powerfully developed by Smith among 
other classical economists. In a very intriguing study of the possible influence the Greek 
philosophers had on Smith’s theory of the division of labor, Foley (1974) has gone so far as to 
suggest “that Smith could have gotten his original inspiration from the division of labor principle, not 
from the sources usually cited in this connection --- the Encyclopédie, Harris, Locke, Mun, or 
Mandeville – but from the ancient Greeks” (pp.221-2), notably from Plato who “provides Smith with 
important initial inspirations” (p.235) to Smith’s theory of progressive division of labor in connection 
with his four-stage societal evolution. For a discussion on the fundamental difference between the 
two men, however, see McNulty (1975).  
 
Although it is already rightly pointed out in Plato (1997, 1010-11) that the double coincidence 
problem of wants between buyers and sellers in the marketplace gives rise to currency, it is 
Aristotle (350BC; 1921, Politica, Book I, Chapter 9, pp. 1257a-1257b) who offered a vivid 
illustration of the origin of barter money and its evolution into fiat money. Aristotle articulated the 
necessity of money in maintaining the network of social (inter-household) exchange of 
commodities. It may be worth emphasizing that Aristotle’s analysis of the function of money is 
rooted in his focus on the trade between households in his city-state setting, rather than the 
genuine market exchange between a good number of sellers and buyers.
3  
 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the Greeks are not the only ones, even at their time, to observe the 
phenomenon of increasing returns to labor specialization. For instance, in ancient China at roughly 
the same time of Plato, Mencius (390BC-305BC), and a bit later on, Hsün Tsu (Xun Kuang), both 
argued for the necessity and significance of the social division of labor, and the division between 
mental labor and manual labor. (refer to, e.g., Hu 1988, pp. 65-66 and pp 167-8). 
Schumpeter’s (1954) “Great Gap” thesis, stating that very little if any was achieved in economic 
analysis during the several centuries before the rise of Latin Scholastics in the 13
th century, has 
  3been challenged in recent decades by Essid (1987), Ghazanfar (2000) and Hosseini (1998) among 
others. It is widely known among students of medieval cultures that medieval Islam played a crucial 
role in the intellectual movement originating from the Greeks and eventually resulting in the rise of 
European Scholastics. As documented in Philip Hitti’s (1970/2002) monumental volume, the 
“rediscovery” of Aristotlian scholarship and the renaissance of Europe would have been simply 
unimaginable but for the intellectual contribution by medieval Islamic scholarship which had a 
definitive influence on St Albert the Great and St Thomas Aquinas (and thereby on later 
generations of scholars including political economists, see below): when “Europe was almost 
totally ignorant of Greek thought and science”, the Islamic scholars during “the great epoch of 
translation” (mid 8
th century to mid 9
th century) had already got well acquainted with, and further 
developed, Aristotlian scholarship (2002, p. 315).  
 
As far as the economics of the division of labor is concerned, it seems that medieval Islamic 
scholarship was absorbed by the Latin Scholastics, without due acknowledgement though, thereby 
exerting influence on Mercantilists and classical political economists including Adam Smith (see, 
e.g., Essid 1987 and Hosseini 1998). As is nicely demonstrated in Hosseini (1988, pp 667-673), 
social division of labor was discussed by Fārābi (875-50), sexual division of labor by Ibn Sīna 
(Avicenna 980-1037) and Tusi (1201-1274), and most prominently, a more general treatment by al-
Ghazali (1058-1111), “unquestionably the greatest theologian of Islam and one of its noblest and 
most original thinkers” (Hitti 2002, p.431). Al-Ghazali appears to have well understood the 
interrelation between market exchange and the division of labor. More impressively, al-Ghazali’s 
theory of vertical division of labor strikingly resembles Adam Smith’s in an interesting manner. In 
his most important book, Ihya Ulum al-Din (Revivification of the Sciences of Religion), paralleling 
to, and constituting an influence on, St Thomas Aquinas’ Summa Theologica (Ghazanfar 2000, 
pp.863-4), al-Ghazali wrote explicitly on the division of labor,  
 
“For a bread, for example, first the farmer prepares and cultivates the land, then the bullock 
and tools are needed to plough the land. Then the land is irrigated. It is cleared from weeds, 
then the crop is harvested and grains are cleaned and separated. Then there is milling into 
flour before baking. Just imagine – how many tasks are involved; and we here mention just 
only some. And imagine the number of people performing these various tasks, and the 
number of various kinds of tools, made from iron, wood, stone, etc. If one inquires, one will 
find that perhaps a single loaf of bread takes its final shape with the help of perhaps more 
than a thousand workers” (Ihya, 4:118; quoted in Ghazanfar and Islahi 1990, p. 390). 
 
In further articulating the gains from, and necessary coordination in, the manufacture division of 
labor, al-Ghazali took needle production as an example, “even the small needle becomes useful 
  4only after passing through the hands of needle-makers about twenty-five times, each time going 
through a different process” (Ihya, 4:119; quoted in Ghazanfar and Islahi 1990, p. 390). As it 
happened, al-Ghazanfar’s needle example well resembles the French Encyclopédie’s “Epingle” 
(1750s) production (consisting of eighteen separate processes), from which Smith’s famous pin-
factory story is taken (see below).  
 
We now turn to another towering figure of Islamic thought, Ibn Khaldūn (1332-1406), whose The 
Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History (1402/1958) firmly established himself as “the greatest 
historical philosopher Islam produced and one of the greatest of all time” (Hitti 2002, p.568). This 
man is perhaps one of the most original minds in social sciences in general and in economic 
sciences in particular across all human civilizations. His deep insights into the socio-economic 
dynamics, that the driving forces of historical change come from within the present social 
structures, long anticipated the Scots, Karl Marx, Joseph Schumpeter and Mancur Olson (see, 
e.g., Kuran 1987, pp108-110) and he has been deservedly claimed as one forerunner of a great 
number of European thinkers in socio-politics and historical philosophy. In the field of economics at 
large, his contributions have nonetheless been considerably under-estimated relative to what they 
deserve. As demonstrated in Boulakia (1971) and Soofi (1995), Ibn Khaldūn can be well claimed in 
economics as a forerunner of Ricardo and Marx in labor theory of value, of Malthus in population 
theory, of Keynes in the theory of the expenditure multiplier, and most relevant to our purpose 
here, of Smith in the theory of the division of labor. Indeed, there emerges from his masterpiece 
The Muqaddimah a coherent division of labor theory of production. Anticipating Turgot (1769-70) 
and Smith (1776), Ibn Khaldūn (1402) starts with analysis of the prerequisite and formation of 
civilization in his opening sentences of chapter one in The Muqaddimah by emphasizing the 
necessity of, and gains from, the division of labor. Later on, in chapters V and VI, which are largely 
about what centuries later was referred to as political economy, he cogently demonstrated that the 
division of labor facilitated by a larger market leads to higher productivity and renders products 
cheaper. Effectively developing a labor theory of value, he further argued that capital has to be 
understood essentially as a realized value from previous labor, and that capital, as intermediate 
products in the linkage of vertical production, in turn enhances further labor productivity. As such, 
his capital theory resembles Smith, Ricardo, and more strikingly, Marx. Nonetheless, Ibn Khaldūn, 
not trapped in the labor theory of value, on a number of occasions, explicitly talked about both 
demand and supply sides in the price determination. His observation of the enormous, positive 
impact of production and consumption of luxury goods on the division of labor and social 
civilization anticipated Mandeville and French Encyclopédists.
4 He also illustrated why the wage of 
the skilled laborer is higher in a larger city than otherwise.
5      
          
  5II.  EMERGENCE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE DIVISION OF LABOR 
More direct precursors of Smith on doctrines of the division of labor of course are Petty, 
Mandeville, Hutcheson and the French Encyclopédists among others. William Petty (1671/1690, 
1683; 1963, Vol. I pp.260-1 and Vol.II p.473) used the production of clothes, watches and ships as 
telling examples to illustrate gains from specialization of labor. Henry Martyn (the mysterious 
“anonymous” author of the well known pamphlet Considerations on the East-India Trade 1701)
6, 
taking his cue from Petty and the brilliant mercantilist Dudley North (1691), also used examples of 
making cloth, ships and watches to show the productivity implication of the division of labor. 
Incidentally, both also touch upon the issue of specialization of machinery, while Martyn (1701) 
seems to be much more aware of its far-reaching consequences, especially in bringing “more order 
and regularity into manufactures” (1968, p.67), which is more often referred to as “standardization 
(of products)” in the literature nowadays. This theme was later further explored by Charles 
Babbage, Andrew Ure and John S. Mill among others (see below).  As is widely known, Mandeville 
(1714-1729/1957) coined the very term “division of labor” and exemplified its significance by taking, 
once again, the instance of cloth-making.
7 Hutcheson (1755/1968, pp. 287-90) articulated the 
necessity of the division of labor and cooperation for civilized society.  
 
The extent to which Smith’s celebrated division of labor principle was directly inspired by the 
French Encyclopédie has long been a focus of controversy. It cannot be denied after all that the 
three major advantages of labor specialization Smith (1776, Chapter 1) famously identified --- 
namely, increase in dexterity in every particular workman, saving of time in passing from one job to 
another, and invention of machines (technical progress) --- have figured out clearly in Encyclopédie 
(1751/1968, pp. 17-8). In particular, as to the well known example of pin-making that Smith used to 
illustrate the efficiency implication of the division of labor, Edwin Cannan remarked that, 
  
“In Adam Smith’s Lecture, p. 164, the business is, as here, divided into eighteen operations. 
This number is doubtless taken from the Encyclopédie, tom.v (published in 1755), s.v. 
Épingle. The article is ascribed to M. Delaire, ‘qui décrivait la fabrication de l´épingle dans 
les ateliers même des ouvriers,’ p.807. In some factories the division was carried further. E. 
Chambers, Cyclopedia, vol. ii, 2
nd ed., 1738, and 4
th ed., 1741, s.v., Pin., makes the number 
of separate operations twenty-five.” (The Wealth of Nations, edited by E. Cannan, Methuen, 
1950, p.8, footnote 4).     
 
As Lough (1970, p.17) rightly points out, it is an extremely tricky business to figure out what source 
and how much Diderot and his colleagues drew on from the English encyclopaedias, and so is the 
matter as to how much the English encyclopaedia in turn derived from the non-English sources. 
But Chambers’(1941) Cyclopaedia may most likely be credited as one source for the French 
  6Encyclopédia. Note, however, as mentioned above, in al-Ghazali’s needle-factory example, the 
number of separate operations is also twenty-five, an interesting coincidence to Chambers’ story. 
Another interesting facet of the pin-factory episode is that the French Encyclopédia’s pin example, 
as well as the derived principle of the division of labor, finds its original source decades earlier, in 
the brilliant German scholar Ernst Ludwig Carl’s (1682-1743) three-volume Treatise (1722-3),  an 
overlooked original theorist in the history of economic thought, who seems to be well aware of the 
gains from labor specialization as well as the profound implication of market size for the division of 
labor in manufacture. Incidentally, Carl mentioned both needle and pin factories when exemplifying 
the effect of manufacture division of labor (Hutchison 1988, pp 160-3 and footnote 2 on p.396).  
 
Both Ferguson (1767) and Turgot (1769-70) contain important insights into the crucial role played 
by the division of labor in social civilization and socio-economic development, thus giving rise to 
two much debated controversies over priority of the division of labor principle, namely the “Turgot-
Smith myth” (termed by Edwin Cannan, see Groenewegen 1969, p.271, footnote 3) and the 
“Ferguson-Smith controversy”. The opening chapters of Turgot (1769-70) focus on economies of 
the division of labor, strikingly resembling Smith’s magnum opus published a few years later. There 
also exists similarity in the theoretical frameworks between the two books. These, in addition to 
personal acquaintance and correspondence between the two men, give rise, naturally, to 
speculations and controversies over the priority of Smith (1776). We do not intend to delve into this 
controversy and related literature here. Interested readers may refer to, for instance, 
Groenewegen’s (1969) nice treatment and references therein. Groenewegen’s scrutiny of the two 
authors’ writings and historical evidence of contact between the two men suggests that the charge 
against Smith is not well grounded despite the similarity between their books, for they appear to be 
inspired by the same group of scholars’ writings, namely, Locke, Cantillon, Hume and Quesnay 
(Groenewegen 1969, p.287). As to the Ferguson-Smith controversy over the priority of the division 
of labor doctrine, see, e.g., Hamowy (1968), which demonstrates that Smith’s charge of plagiarism 
against Ferguson’s (1767) analysis of the division of labor can not hold. Nor does the opposite 
suggestion, made by Karl Marx among others, that Smith borrowed Ferguson’s theory of the 
division of labor without giving due credit. I can only concur with Hamowy that it is Ferguson who 
had developed a penetrating analysis of the far-reaching sociological consequences of the division 
of labor, which afterwards, interestingly, served as a major inspiration to two fundamentally 
different figures: Marx and Hayek.         
 
As Smith’s celebrated economics of the division of labor is well known, we make only a few points 
below. Firstly, it cannot be denied that it is Smith who made the greatest contribution to the 
economics of the division of labor even in the light of penetrating insights of forerunners including 
Plato, Ibn Khaldūn and Mandeville as mentioned earlier, for only in Smith’s hand was the division 
  7of labor assigned the central role in the system of economic analysis and did economic science per 
se emerge as a systematic scientific enterprise under such an overarching theme. Schumpeter’s 
(1954, p.187) oft-cited remarks contain elements of truth of particular relevance, at a certain 
measure of exaggeration, as to the treatment of the division of labor in Smith (1776), “there is 
nothing original about it, one feature must be mentioned that has not received the attention it 
deserves: nobody, either before or after A. Smith, ever thought of putting such a burden upon 
division of labor. With A. Smith, it is practically the only factor in economic progress”. As is widely 
known among students of history of ideas in social sciences, it is often both tedious and less fruitful 
than one would initially expect to trace the original source of virtually any idea, testified by the 
commonsense contained in the proverb, “nothing is new under the sun”. To put many old ideas into 
a well framed, novel scientific superstructure itself is a most important achievement and deserves 
the highest credit. Secondly, Smith does differ from his forerunners in an important way. The 
intellectual powerfulness of his mind well allows for a coherently  and  systematically presented 
scientific theory of labor specialization that contains many brilliant ideas, which perhaps were well 
known to a good number of his contemporaries and earlier authors, but whose importance remains 
to be illustrated and more fully appreciated. For instance, in Smith’s theory of the division of labor, 
differences between individuals of different occupations, “is not upon many occasions so much the 
cause, as the effect of the division of labor” (1776/1976, Chapter 2, p. 28). As such, the Smithian 
endogenous comparative advantage sharply differs from many, including notions attributed to Plato 
and other Greeks, before him as well as many influential ones like the Ricardian exogenous 
comparative advantage as the cause of division of labor after him (Ricardo, 1817/1965). This 
difference, subtle as it is, has been already noticed, but perhaps more needs to be drawn on its far-
reaching implications for understanding politico-philosophy, economic development, international 
trade, government intervention, etc. (Cf. Houthakker 1956, McNulty 1975, Foley 1975, Yang 1994, 
Buchanan and Yoon 2000 and Buchanan 2005). The last point we should like to make here is that 
in elaborating on “old” ideas Smith realized some deep, hitherto often overlooked, connection 
among different aspects of potential gains from the division of labor. A case in point is his clear 
perception of the inter-dependence between the division of labor and the extent of the market, to 
which we shall immediately turn in the next section.    
                
III.   EXTENT OF THE MARKET, INCREASING RETURNS AND THE DIVISION OF LABOR: 
FROM ADAM SMITH TO ALLYN YOUNG    
The idea that the division of labor is limited by the extent of the market, as mentioned above, has 
long before Smith figured in the writings of Xenophon, Plato and Ibn Khaldūn. Incidentally, the 
authors, as well as Smith and quite a few other classical political economists, all relate the 
population   size,  in   the  city  in  particular, to  the extent  to  which  the employment may be 
divided. In addition, Plato (1997, The Republic, pp. 1008-13), North (1691), Mandeville 
  8(1714/1729), Ferguson (1767), all have realized the importance of (foreign) trade to the division of 
labor in (domestic) production, and hence to economic development.  
 
But Smith appears to be the first author to be well aware of the other side of the coin: division of 
labor plays a crucial role in determining the extent of the market, as revealed by Wakefield’s (1835) 
perusal of Smith’s (1776) Wealth of Nations. As a matter of fact, Wakefield (1835), drawing upon 
the work of Richard Whately (1831), who insightfully saw political economy as a science of 
exchange and whom Wakefield highly regarded as “a profound thinker and a powerful reasoner”, 
considerably substantiated the theory of mutual reinforcement between the two things. His 
reasoning, a fairly interesting one indeed, can be summarized as the following. The division of 
labor is, as has been widely understood, depends on the extent of the market, that is, “the power of 
exchanging”. But the latter, Wakefield argues, “depends on the productiveness of labor 
employment which relate to the means of subsistence”, especially the productiveness of 
agriculture, which in turn depends on fertility of soil and climate, which are “beyond the control of 
man”, and labor’s skill. We are thus lead to an important proposition, “that while division of 
employments is limited by the extent of the market, the extent of the market is, in great measure, at 
least, limited by the division of employments.” (Wakefield 1835, p. 81). Wakefield nonetheless sees 
in no way his treatment on this issue as completion of a promising scientific inquiry. Rather, he 
calls for a more systematic undertaking,  
      
“(T)he division of employments and the power of exchanging are mutually dependent 
means of increasing human enjoyments. At the same time, however, it must be confessed, 
that the power of exchanging has not been thoroughly analyzed by any writer on the 
subject. Of what elements that complex power is composed, and by what circumstances it 
is apt to be increased or diminished; these are questions which would occupy much space 
in a complete treatise on the principles of political economy.” (Wakefield 1835, p. 82) 
 
It  is  worth  noting  that  Wakefield  seriously  took issue with Smith, charging the term “division of 
labor”, which is taken from Mandeville and used throughout in Smith’s writings, as misleading. He 
submitted that it should be referred to instead as “division of employment” or “division of 
operations”, which necessarily implies another important aspect of the social phenomenon of what 
Smith refers to as “the division of labor”: “union of labor”, or more generally yet, “cooperation”.
8 
Remarkably, Wakefield applied his “cooperation principle” into practice in his well known social 
experiments in the American colony, an achievement John S. Mill (1848, Chapter VIII, pp. 116-122, 
esp. p. 121) admired with great passion in his further elaboration of the “cooperation principle” 
underlying the division of labor.  
  9Marshall (1890) draws on biological analogies in his articulation on the “two sides of the same 
coin”, emphasizing, one the one hand, the increased specialization of labor skill, knowledge, 
machinery (“differentiation”) and, on the other, the more intimate and firm connection facilitated by 
markets between separate parts (“integration”) of what he famously refers to as “the industrial 
organism” (Book 4, Chapter VIII).
9            
This naturally brings us to a topic of importance to later advancement in theories of increasing 
returns, namely the productivity implication of such an industrial organism (especially for the 
particular individual firm), for which Marshall introduced the notion of “external economies” (to what 
Marshall referred to as “the representative firm” within the industry). As Sraffa (1926) cogently 
demonstrates with his characteristic precision, increasing returns, as originating from the division of 
labor in the classical political economy literature, cannot be accommodated within a Marshallian 
competitive framework.
10      
 
Partially in response to, and in defense of Marshall’s concept of external economies against, 
attacks initialized in Sraffa’s (1926), Allyn Young, in his presidential address before the section of 
Economic Sciences and Statistics of the British Association for the Advancement of Science at 
Glasgow, on Sept 10, 1928, drew heavily upon the ideas of the best known man the city has ever 
produced, 
  
“I shall venture to put further stress upon two points … The first point is that the principal 
economies which manifest themselves in increasing returns are the economies of 
capitalistic or roundabout methods of production … largely identical with the economies of 
the division of labor in its most important modern forms. … The second point is that the 
economies of roundabout methods, even more than the economies of other forms of the 
division of labor, depend upon the extent of the market — and that, of course, is why we 
discuss them under the head of increasing returns.” (Young, p. 530-1)). 
 
To Young, Marshall’s external economies to an individual firm arise from the whole industrial 
organism, that is, the network of exchanges and connections among separate parts of the division 
of labor. He explicitly points out that Marshall’s external economies “show themselves only in 
changes of the organization of the industry as a whole”. As such, to focus on the scale of operation 
by the individual firm, or even the individual industry, is misleading. The promising direction to 
pursue, Young contends, is to investigate the interdependence between the complicated network 
of exchange with a great  number  of nexus and dense linkages among them on the one hand, and 
on the other the progressive division of labor in production, which often manifests itself in 
roundabout methods of production in its modern forms.
11 He thus concludes his address as, 
   
  10“(T)he division of labor depends upon the extent of the market, but the extent of the market 
also depends upon the division of labor. In this circumstance lies the possibility of economic 
progress, apart from the progress which comes as a result of the new knowledge which 
men are able to gain, whether in the pursuit of their economic or of their non-economic 
interests.” (pp. 539-40)   
 
It is interesting to notice that while Wakefield established the interdependence between the extent 
of the market and the division of employment by largely drawing upon the productiveness of labor 
employed in agriculture, Young focused on the market for intermediate products in manufacturing 
industries, partially due to the American’s overriding of UK in manufacturing industries, a topic 
receiving much attention at Young’s time. Another, indeed more important,  reason, however, lies 
in his appreciation of insights contained in Marshall’s industrial organism theory, which was under 
attack or/and being misunderstood by Sraffa and Knight among others, and which Young 
decisively and powerfully defended as one important tradition older than the Marshallian 
economics per se.  
 
IV.   DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY AND DIVISION OF LABOR IN MANUFACTURE 
As indicated earlier, the division of labor in manufacture has on many occasions been discussed 
before the rise of the factory-system: e.g., the needle production in Ibn Khaldūn (1402) and Carl 
(1722-3), the pin production   in   Carl,   Chambers’s   Cyclopedia (1741),   the      French 
Encyclopédie (1751) and Smith (1763, 1776), etc. Despite that Smith (1776) unquestionably 
contains many insights of enormous influence to later economic theories, especially of the division 
of labor, Smith did fail to grasp some important points. As criticized rightly by Dugald Stewart, 
Babbage, Ure, and Cannan among a few others (Cf. Cannan 1964, pp. 96-8), and recently by 
Rashid (1986), Smith’s treatment is rather too narrowly focused on the primitive production of the 
pin and its like, largely ignorant of the role played by other factors, including machinery and 
economic organization. Smith established convincingly the relation between the extent of the 
market and the division of labor exploiting the pin-factory example, which is nonetheless 
misleading as far as the crucial distinction between social division of labor and manufacture 
division of labor is concerned. The reason is fairly simple: the pin-factory model cannot be 
meaningfully interpreted as a theory of social division of labor coordinated by an (often 
complicated) network of market exchange (Cf., e.g., Buchanan 1994). Of course, as it happened, 
and as has been hopefully demonstrated above, inadequacy in Smith’s analysis left great room for 
Young to considerably elaborate on such an important topic in his brilliant presidential address 
(1928).  
 
  11Unsatisfied with, as well as inspired by, Smith’s treatment of the division of labor, Babbage (1835), 
Ure (1835) and John Mill (1848), before Marx (1867), to whom we shall shortly devote more 
detailed discussion, emphasized the fundamental change in the landscape of manufacturing and 
industrial organizations caused by the factory-system thriving at their time, and investigated the 
underlying division of labor principles. Babbage pointed to fixed learning costs, in terms of “time” 
and “waste of material” in apprenticeship, as another important factor of increasing returns to 
scale, which indeed would play the central role in the literature of human capital and labor 
specialization represented by Rosen (1983) and Barzel and Yu (1984) in the 1980s. Babbage’s 
major contribution, however, lies in his “new principle” of standardization in manufacturing, on 
which the principal forerunner of modern computer science offers a nice illustration of how the 
principle can be practically applied to produce an extremely spectacular effect even in the division 
of  mental labor (refer to Babbage, 1832/1989, pp. 135-40 for the fascinating story of how the 
French mathematician, de Prony, inspired by a random read of Adam Smith’s (1776) opening 
chapters on the division of labor, organized the making of logarithematical and trigonometric 
functions based on elementary difference calculations).
12 Ure (1835) further argues that a definitive 
feature of the standardized production due to extensive employment of manufacturing machines is 
that the machinery supercedes skillful labors. John S. Mill (1848) highlights the organizational 
change and large-scale manufacturing, which allow for a greater degree of the division of labor 
within the factory.  
 
Notwithstanding the above authors’ important observations, it appears fair to say that the analysis 
on the connection and distinction between the division of labor in society and division of labor in 
manufacturing finds it culmination in Karl Marx (1867, Volume One, Book 1, Part 4, Chapter 14, 
Section 4), which provide stimulating intellectual source even to theorists of economic 
organizations today. Marx firstly pointed out, rightly, that the manufacture division of labor 
originated historically from the development in social division of labor but exerts feedback on, and 
indeed further promotes, the latter. Moving on to their fundamental difference, Marx wrote,  
  
“in spite of the numerous analogies and links connecting them, the division of labor in the 
interior of a society, and that in the interior of a workshop, differ not only in degree, but also 
in kind. …. But what is it that forms the bond between the independent labors of the cattle-
breeder, the tanner and the shoemaker? It is the fact that their respective products are 
commodities. What, on the other hand, characterizes the division of labor in manufacture? 
The fact that the specialized worker produces no commodities. It is only the common 
product of all the specia1ized workers that becomes a commodity. The division of labor 
within society is mediated through the purchase and sale of the products of different 
branches of industry, while the connection between the various partial operations in a 
  12workshop is mediated through the sale of the labor-power of several workers to one 
capitalist, who applies it as combined labor-power. … Division of labor within the workshop 
implies the undisputed authority of the capitalist over men, who are merely the members of 
a total mechanism which belongs to him. The division of labor within society brings into 
contact independent producers of commodities, who acknowledge no authority other than 
that of competition, of the coercion exerted by the pressure of their reciprocal interests.” 
(pp. 474-7; my emphasis). 
 
For Marx, the definitive distinction between social division of labor and manufacture division of 
labor is rooted in mechanisms by which they are respectively coordinated. In the former, it is the 
decentralized market exchange of commodities, while in the latter the centralized mediation of 
labor allocation characterized by the employment relationship. Marx’s observation on the sale of 
labor (within factory) or commodities (in society) essentially grasps one major aspect of modern 
transaction cost theories of the firm. (see, e.g., Coase 1937, Pitelis 1994, Yang and Ng 1995, 
Holmstrom 1999). The distinction made by Marx between the two major mechanisms by which the 
division of labor is coordinated, i.e., authority in the employment relation associated with the firm 
and decentralized exchange without central authority in the market, must have a familiar ring to a 
Coasian economist, for it is precisely this distinction that plays the crucial role in Coase’s (1937) 
celebrated theory of the firm. Yet, Coase did not seem to be aware of Marx’s pioneering insights 
when developing his path-breaking transaction cost theory of the firm (Cf. Putterman and Kroszner 
1996, p.17).   
 
As to organization of production within a factory, Amasa Walker (1874) made some fairly 
interesting points on coordination (supervision) costs, which he presciently realized impose 
limitations to “prevent aggregation of capital … (that) would (otherwise) swallow up the whole 
industry of a state” (p. 40).
13 Coordination costs, or essentially the same thing put in different 
terms, of course has received a great deal of attention in the modern literature as a limiting factor 
of the division of labor, especially of the scale of operations of the firm, (see, e.g., Williamson 1967, 
Becker and Murphy 1992 among many others).  
 
One major detrimental sociological consequence of the division f labor, namely, alienation, has 
occurred virtually throughout the history of ideas of the division of labor, ranging from Plato 
(Apology; see Plato 1997, pp22-23) and Aristotle (Cf. e.g., Gordon 1993, p.3) to Ferguson (1767), 
Smith (1776), Ure (1835), Marx (1867), let alone to mention philosophical critique by Rousseau, 
Herder, Schiller, Hegel, etc.
14 No attempt, however, is made here to consider the voluminous 
literature, mostly sociological, philosophical or political, centred around such a topic of undoubted 
importance. Instead, I content myself with referring only to some particularly interesting conceptual 
  13clarifications. The seeming contradiction contained in Smith’s (1776) writings on the positive and 
negative effects of the division of labor could be largely resolved by drawing a distinction between 
its  economic  (favorable) and sociological (partly unfavorable) consequences. (see, e.g., 
Groenewegen 1977 and an exchange of views between West 1964 and Rosenberg 1965). 
Although Ferguson (1767) and Smith (1776) both explicitly discuss harmful effects on specialized 
laborers, as already mentioned, Ferguson (1767) appears of deeper insight to its far-reaching 
sociological consequences, having served as a more important inspiration on this crucial point to 
both Marx and Hayek.
15 Marx’s (1844, 1867) “alienation” thesis of the capitalist division of labor is 
more complicated in several dimensions than Smith and Ferguson’s. West (1969) contends, by 
drawing upon sociologists’ approach to studies of alienation of which a survey is found in Seeman 
(1959), that Marx’s alienation indeed includes “powerlessness”, “isolation”, and the most 
philosophically rich notion of “self-estrangement” (dehumanized, and alienated from the laborer’s 
“inner self”) and that the similarity between Smith and Marx’s understanding of the harmful 
sociological effect of the division of labor largely lies in the third aspect: self-estrangement 
alienation. It should go without saying that the sociological consequences, both favorable aspects 
(social cohesion, for instance) and unfavorable ones, have been extensively explored in sociology 
(see, for instance, Durkheim’s (1893/1933) classical study of social division of labor).  
 
 
V.   SPONTANEOUS ORDER, MONEY AND KNOWLEDGE: MANDEVILLE, FERGUSON 
AND THE AUSTRIAN INSIGHTS 
As shown above, it seems legitimate to claim that Ibn Khaldūn deserves to be seen as one 
pioneering theorist of the self-generating socio-economic dynamics. The very thesis of the 
spontaneous order, was nonetheless fully developed only in the hands of Mandeville, the Scots 
and Austrians. It is Mandeville, as Hayek (1978, p.250) points out, who made the “definitive 
breakthrough in modern thought of the twin ideas of evolution and of the spontaneous formation of 
an order”. It appears that Hayek (1960) coined the term “spontaneous order”. That which emerged 
from Mandeville’s writings is nicely summarized by Hayek as, 
 
“His main contention became simply that in the complex order of society the results of 
men’s actions were very different from what they had intended, and that the individuals, in 
pursuing their own ends, whether selfish or altruistic, produced useful results for others 
which they did not anticipate or perhaps even know; and finally, that the whole order of 
society, and even all that we call culture, was the result of individual strivings which had no 
such end in view, but which were channelled to serve such ends by institutions, practices, 
  14and rules which also had never been deliberately invented but had grown up by the survival 
of what proved successful.” (1978, p.253) 
 
It is worth noticing that the theme of spontaneously generated order is an overarching one, of 
which the spontaneous market order coordinated by the decentralized price system stands only as 
one special case, and so do the language, morals, money, property rights, etc.
16  
 
The Scottish moral philosophers, noticeably David Hume, Adam Smith and Adam Ferguson, 
significantly further developed Mandeville’s thesis of the spontaneously formed order, especially its 
vast importance to understanding the self-regulating nature of the market in coordinating the 
division of labor and exchange.
17 Largely through Hume and Savigny, Mandeville’s thesis was also 
an important inspiration to Carl Menger’s theory of the formation of law, morals, market order, and 
money (Hayek 1978, pp.264-5).  
 
One remarkable feature of Ferguson’s theory of spontaneously formed social orders including the 
division of labor and civil laws is its emphasis on unintended consequences of actions of numerous 
ordinary human individuals (1867). He wrote,  
 
“Mankind, in following the present sense of their minds, in striving to remove 
inconveniencies, or to gain apparent and contiguous advantages, arrive at ends which even 
their imagination could not anticipate, and pass on, like other animals, in the track of their 
nature, without perceiving its end. He who first said, “I will appropriate this field: I will leave 
it to my heirs”, did not perceive, that he was laying the foundation of civil laws and political 
establishments.” (1767/1995, p.119). 
 
It may deserve notice that the last point above spells out what later on appears as a promising 
research agenda on the origin and evolution of property rights (see, e.g., Sugden 1989). 
 
Ferguson’s emphasis on the unintended long-term consequence of interplay of actions, rather than 
of designs, which individuals undertake in pursuing myopically their own ends, was highly regarded 
and significantly advanced by Hayek (see, Ferguson 1767/1995, p.119, Hayek 1967), who, 
unquestionably the most original and the most important thinker in the 20
th century of the 
spontaneous order theory without which theories of liberalism would be unimaginable, pioneered 
some important theses to be “rediscovered” by complexity scientists during 1980-1990s.
18 Indeed, 
Hayek’s theory of the spontaneously generated social order has become one thriving industry 
since the fall of the Berlin Wall (see, e.g., Birner and van Zijp 1994, Vanberg 1994 and Fleetwood 
1995).  
  15 
But in what follows we focus on only his socio-economic theory of (dispersed) knowledge, perhaps 
the most important contribution among many other ones made by Hayek to the economic 
science.
19 Critically examining the meaning of “economic equilibrium” in his 1937 “Economics and 
Knowledge” paper, a turning point not only for Hayek himself in economic thinking, Hayek identifies 
what he sees as the “central question of all social sciences:  How can the combination of 
fragments of knowledge existing in different minds bring about results which, if they were to be 
brought about deliberately, would require a knowledge on the part of the directing mind which no 
single person can possess?” (Hayek 1948/1937, p.54). As a matter of fact, the question Hayek 
asks also lies in the very core of the Smithian economics, namely, the economics of how the 
division of labor (and hence division of knowledge), which Smith believes constitutes the source of 
economic progress, can be coordinated by the “invisible hand”. Division of labor necessarily 
implies division of knowledge, or as Hayek characteristically puts it, dispersion of knowledge 
among individuals. As such, any scientific theory of the division of labor has to come to grips with a 
sound understanding of how the knowledge dispersed among individuals of different 
specializations is utilized by society as a whole (Hayek 1945). Hayek convincingly rules out the 
feasibility for any imaginable central planning mechanism to undertake this task, for the data of 
which the central authority can make use to do such a job has to be “given”, yet the dispersed 
knowledge of particular circumstances, which are continuously changing, of time and space, can 
not be given as such.      
 
It is the decentralized price system, standing as an instance of spontaneous orders, that can 
effectively convey the local knowledge among the individuals and thus makes efficient utilization of 
the dispersed knowledge. 
   
“The price system is just one of those formations which man has learned to use (though he 
is still very far from having learned to make the best use of it) after he had stumbled upon it 
without understanding it. Through it not only a division of labor but also a coordinated 
utilization of resources based on an equally divided knowledge has become possible.” 
(Hayek 1945, p. 528)  
 
Decades later, in a public lecture, Hayek puts it more succinctly, “We can have a far-reaching 
division of labor only by relying on the impersonal signals of prices” (Hayek 1983, pp 19-20). 
 
In illustrating the powerfulness of the price system in utilizing division of knowledge and division of 
labor, Hayek remarkably noticed that, “The most significant fact about this system is the economy 
of knowledge with which it operates, or how little the individual participants need to know in order 
  16to be able to take the right action” (1945, pp. 526-7). The economy of information required by the 




As mentioned earlier, the necessity of money as a medium of exchange to support the network of 
the division of labor was already noticed by Greeks. John Law and Adam Smith further elaborated 
on this topic, and in fact Smith illustrated in anthropological details the origin of barter money and 
its historical evolution into fiat money. Despite that, it is only in the hands of Carl Menger (1892) 
that a theory of the origin of money as a spontaneously generated institution was developed.
21 
Menger’s central thesis is that the nature of commodity which can be used as the medium of 
exchange (money) lies in its degree of “Absatzfähigkeit” (“saleableness”, as translated by Caroline 
A. Foley in 1892; Leland B. Yeager and Monika Streissler translate as “marketability” (see Menger 
2002)), and that money essentially arises spontaneously from interplay of individuals’ pursuit of 
their own self-interests without government intervention. 
 
It should be noticed that Menger (1892) also indicates the role played “by way of legislation” in 
establishing the social institution of money, but emphasizes that “this is neither the only, nor the 
primary mode in which money has taken its origin” (p. 250). He contends that the network effect, a 
crucial element in the interplay between decentralized actions of heterogeneous agents, suffices 
for the most marketable commodity to be eventually instituted as money.
22 Despite some 
controversies centred around Menger’s thesis that money as a social institution arises without 
intervention from social organizations,
23 Menger (1892), as it happened, has recently been serving 
as a major intellectual inspiration to an extensive literature of the origin of money, which indeed is 
still explosively growing. Schmitz (2002) provides a critical review of neoclassical theories of 
money, represented by Townsend’s (1980) spatial separation model, the overlapping generation 
dynamics model, and most prominently, the search model originating from Kiyotaki and Wright ( 
1989, 1991). Schmitz cogently argues that, compared to Menger’s original theory on the genesis of 
money, a common and major drawback of all the above-mentioned models is their crucial 
assumption of an exogenously given social institution of money, which effectively begs the very 
Mengerian question of its emergence.  
 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Hopefully we have in the above sketched out, at least one major part of, the conceptual 
development of the economics of division of labor over twenty-five centuries up to Hayek’s (1940s) 
thesis of the division of knowledge as a by-product of the division of labor. In particular, we 
emphatically highlight important insights of ancient Greeks, medieval Islam and pre-Smithian 
political economists, and critically review literature of recent two centuries on three deliberately 
  17chosen topics, namely, the interdependence between the division of labor and the extent of the 
market, distinction as well as connection between social division of labor and manufacturing 
division of labor, and the spontaneous order theory of division of knowledge and the origins of 
money. There are quite some topics of importance, such as implications of increasing returns to 
the division of labor for international trade, economic growth, general equilibrium analysis, 
organizational change, technical progress, income distribution, industrialization, etc., which we 
either discuss fairly briefly and superficially or leave untouched at all in this article, and which we 
leave to a sequel of the present article (Sun forthcoming). Nonetheless, we hope that this article 
might serve as a mini guide-book to the most fundamental developments in history of the 
economics of division of labor.  
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  25NOTES 
                                                  
1  It may be fair to say that Democritus is the first among the Greeks to recognize the intrinsic connection 
between the division of labor and the division of resources as well as the efficiency implications of private 
ownership (refer to, e.g., Gordon (1975), p.4, and Landreth and Colander (1994), pp 21-35.)  
2  The idea of agglomeration economies originating from the division of labor still plays a key role in the 
urban economics literature of the 1990s based on increasing returns, which is prominently represented by 
the so-called New Economic Geography (see, e.g., Yang and Rice 1994, Hochman 1997, Tabuchi 1998, 
Fujita et al 1999 and Sun and Yang 2002).  
3  For a cogently presented analysis of how the philosopher significantly influenced, and was on occasions 
misinterpreted by, the medieval Latin Scholastics, see Gordon (1993).   
4  See, e.g., Goldsmith (1988) for an analysis of Mandeville’s thesis on luxury consumption. On the debate 
between Diderot and his fellow encyclopedists on the good or bad effects of luxury goods, see, e.g., Lough 
(1989, pp.350-4).    
5  To reflect on the development of the modern literature of human capital, note that Gary Becker complains 
as late as the mid-1960s that “surprisingly little attention has been paid to … the influence of market size on 
the incentives to invest in skills” (1964, p.52).  
6  MacLeod (1983) cogently presents an identification of the authorship of the widely read pamphlet as Henry 
Martyn. 
7 For an interesting analysis of the extent to which Mandeville might derive his division of labor principle from 
Plato, see pp 235-8 in Foley (1974).     
8 For a defence of the long used term “division of labor” by William S. Jevons, see Jevons (1875-6/1977), 
p.27. Concurring with Wakefield’s concern about, as well as his insights into, the integration due to 
increasingly dense market exchanging, we shall interchangeably use terms “division of labor” and “division of 
employment” below.           
9 The notion that the economic system can be seen as one part of, and hence embedded in, the social 
organism, or as an independently working organism, is of course an old tradition in economics, which was 
later on lamentably associated with social Darwinism and racism. For instance, see Michael Hutter (1994) for 
an informative historical survey of the German literature on the organism as a metaphor in economics. 
Moreover, the potential powerfulness of the organism analogy which serves as an important inspiration for 
Marshall’s economic analysis of the division of labor network, does not fully play out in his economic system, 
due to his having to resort to the pre-Darwin mechanistic analyses of economic equilibrium (see, e.g., 
Limoges and Ménard 1994).         
10 For the heated debate initialized by Sraffa’s devastating analysis, see the “Increasing Returns and the 
Representative Firm” symposium, The Economic Journal, March 1930 issue. The literature emerging on this 
issue before the mid-1930s, as well as that after the mid-1980s due to the revival of interest in increasing 
returns, is too vast to permit consideration in this Introduction. But I would avail myself to mention that one 
way out of the incomparability of increasing returns and perfect competition is, as suggested by Stigler 
(1941, pp. 72-3), to discard Marshallian partial equilibrium and resort instead to a general equilibrium 
analysis, on which a modern treatment is found in Sun and Lio (2003).       
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11  Young once remarked rather plainly on the manuscript of Frank Knight’s  book to be published as Risk, 
Uncertainty and Profit (Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1921), which was based on Knight’s PhD thesis under the 
supervision of Young, “You miss the point, I fear, of Marshall’s external economies. They are the economies 
(in general) of greater specialization and div. of labor” (Quoted from Blitch 1983, p. 362).       
12  For a short bibliography and contribution to economics by Babbage, see Stigler (1991). 
13 Another observation by Amasa Walker that may be worthy a mention is on the division of mental 
labor. He, drawing attention to increasing specialization in the fields of law and medicine, offers an 
interesting illustration (p. 42).   
14 Refer to Sun (2005a) for a carefully selection of theses on negative aspects of the division of 
labor by Ferguson,. Smith, Ure and Marx.     
15  See, e.g., Hamowy (1968), and Rosenberg (1965, esp. footnote 2 on p.135). 
16  There has recently emerged a literature coming to grips with the origins of social conventions by 
exploiting  evolutionary game theory. For instance, Sugden (1989), drawing on the replicator model in 
evolutionary games, analyses the spontaneously evolving conventions, especially property rights. We shall 
turn to the modern literature of the origin of money that was inspired by Menger (1892) below.      
17  The intellectual influence of Mandeville on the Scots (with measurable reservations on some of 
Mandeville’s views) has been extensively studied. See, e.g., Campbell and Skinner (1982), Hont and 
Ignatieff (1983), Hamowy (1987) and Goldsmith (1988).    
18 Cf. Tucker (1996); for refutations of the “rediscovery” allegation, refer to, e.g., Kilpatrick (2001).  
19  Upon reflecting on his career as an economic theorist, Hayek himself remarks that,“… the paper on 
“Economics and Knowledge” which I read in 1936 as the presidential address to the London Economic Club, 
together with some later related papers reprinted in Individualism and Economic Order (1948), … seems to 
me in retrospect the most original contribution I have made to the theory of economics.” (Kresge and Wenar 
1994, p.79)   
20  The informative nature of the price system had indeed been noticed, without explicit reference to 
dispersed knowledge problem as in Hayek’s theory, in earlier generations of the Austrian economists. See, 
e.g., Streissler (1990)   for an illustration of how Wieser’s economics topics that emerged during 1880-1890s 
had inspired Mises and Hayek.    
21 The most influential, and the most widely read, piece by Menger on money is doubtless his 1892 
Economic Journal publication (translated by Caroline A. Foley), which indeed contains the most important 
elements of his spontaneous order theory of the origin of money. The original article in German, a much 
more lengthy one in Menger’s verbose and unusually complicated writing style, of which his Economic 
Journal 1892 article is a deliberately shortened, more neatly presented version, was accessible to the 
English readership only quite recently due to Leland B. Yeager and Monika Streissler’s valuable work (see 
Menger 2002). The original version is “Geld”, Handwoerterbuch der Staatswissenschaften (3
rd edition), J. 
Conrad et al. (eds.), Vol IV., Fischer, Jena, 1892, pp. 555-610.              
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22  For a recent study that incorporates adaptive learning and network effects into the standard search-
theoretical model in an attempt to account for the spontaneous evolution from barter money to fiat money, 
see Selgin (2003).   
23  See, e.g., Goodhart’s (2004) book review of Latzer and Schmitz (2002) for a criticism of this aspect of 
Menger’s monetary theory.  
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